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Our research adheres to the highest standards of scientifi c rigor. We 
know that one reason the school choice movement has achieved such 
great success is because the empirical evidence really does show that 
school choice works. More and more people are dropping their op-
position to school choice as they become familiar with the large body 
of high-quality scientifi c studies that supports it. Having racked up a 
steady record of success through good science, why would we sabotage 
our credibility with junk science?
This is our answer to those who say we can’t produce credible research 
because we aren’t neutral about school choice. Some people think that 
good science can only be produced by researchers who have no opin-
ions about the things they study. Like robots, these neutral researchers 
are supposed to carry out their analyses without actually thinking or 
caring about the subjects they study.
But what’s the point of doing science in the fi rst place if we’re never al-
lowed to come to any conclusions? Why would we want to stay neutral 
when some policies are solidly proven to work, and others are proven 
to fail?
That’s why it’s foolish to dismiss all the studies showing that school 
choice works on grounds that they were conducted by researchers who 
think that school choice works. If we take that approach, we would 
have to dismiss all the studies showing that smoking causes cancer, 
because all of them were conducted by researchers who think that 
smoking causes cancer. We would end up rejecting all science across 
the board.
The sensible approach is to accept studies that follow sound scientifi c 
methods, and reject those that don’t. Science produces reliable empiri-
cal information, not because scientists are devoid of opinions and mo-
tives, but because the rigorous procedural rules of science prevent the 
researchers’ opinions and motives from determining their results. If 
research adheres to scientifi c standards, its results can be relied upon 
no matter who conducted it. If not, then the biases of the researcher 
do become relevant, because lack of scientifi c rigor opens the door for 
those biases to affect the results.
So if you’re skeptical about our research on school choice, this is our 
challenge to you: prove us wrong. Judge our work by scientifi c stan-
dards and see how it measures up. If you can fi nd anything in our work 
that doesn’t follow sound empirical methods, by all means say so. We 
welcome any and all scientifi c critique of our work. But if you can’t 
fi nd anything scientifi cally wrong with it, don’t complain that our fi nd-
ings can’t be true just because we’re not neutral. That may make a 
good sound bite, but what lurks behind it is a fl at rejection of science.
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School choice programs, which allow students to attend the public or private school of their choice using public funds, have taken root in the U.S. 
and are growing rapidly both in number and size. Their 
fi scal impact has become an important political issue. 
Proponents say school choice saves money because private 
schooling is more effi cient, producing savings for both 
public schools and state budgets. Meanwhile, opponents 
say school choice drains money from public schools.
This study calculates the fi scal impact of every existing 
voucher and tax-credit scholarship program, in order to 
bring empirical evidence to bear on the debate over the 
fi scal impact of school choice. Of the 18 voucher and tax-
credit scholarship programs in the United States, twelve 
began operations before the current school year and their 
fi scal impact can thus be assessed. We did not include 
school choice programs in Iowa, Illinois or Minnesota 
that provide personal tax credits or deductions for private 
school tuition, sine assessing their impact would be 
prohibitively diffi cult.
Key fi ndings include:
School choice programs have saved a total of about 
$444 million from 1990 to 2006, including a total of 
$22 million saved in state budgets and $422 million 
saved in local public school districts.
Every existing school choice program is at least 
fi scally neutral, and most produce a substantial 
savings. Only Utah’s Carson Smith voucher 
program and the two century-old “town tuitioning” 
programs in Maine and Vermont are neutral; every 
other school choice program has produced at least 
$1 million in savings.
In nearly every school choice program, the dollar 
value of the voucher or scholarship is less than or 
equal to the state’s formula spending per student. 
This means states are spending the same amount 
or less on students in school choice programs than 
they would have spent on the same students if they 
had attended public schools, producing a fi scal 
savings.
When a student uses school choice, the local 
public school district no longer needs to pay the 
instructional costs associated with that student, 
but it does not lose all of its per-student revenue, 
because some revenue does not vary with 
enrollment levels. Thus, school choice produces a 
positive fi scal impact for school districts as well as 
for state budgets.
Programs that offer vouchers or scholarships 
both to public school students and to students who 
did not previously attend public schools are now 
offering large enough dollar amounts to attract at 
least 25 percent of their participants from public 
school students. Inducing greater numbers of 
students to migrate from public school to private 
school increases the fi scal savings generated for 
states and public schools from school choice.
Instructional spending per student has consistently 
gone up in all affected public school districts and 
states. School choice has not prevented those states 
and districts from spending more on the students 
who remain in public schools.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1955 Milton Friedman proposed a revolutionary idea for public education in the United States – the government could pay for 
a child’s compulsory education without actually providing it.1  Giving parents control over the spending of the education funding 
designated for their child and allowing them to choose from alternatives created by a thriving education marketplace, he proposed, 
would greatly increase both the effectiveness and the effi ciency of the system.
But in the 1950s, like today, assigning students to schools based on their residential addresses, regardless of their needs or abilities, 
was so deeply entrenched that any alternative was considered too controversial. This was what we, as a nation, had come to know 
and fi nd comfortable. And for a long time this attitude stubbornly resisted any attempt to extend parental choice in education. Even 
as people panicked in the early 1990s when healthcare reform threatened to take away our ability to choose doctors and hospitals, 
many were equally panicked by the idea that parents might be permitted to choose schools.
But at about the same time this panic over health care choice was occurring, Milton Friedman’s idea for school choice was fi nally 
getting its fi rst big test. In 1990, frustrated low-income parents in Milwaukee were offered a chance to escape their failing urban 
school system with publicly funded school vouchers.2  The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program has survived numerous attempts to 
shut it down, and has grown explosively – to the point where the voucher-using student population is equal to almost 20 percent of 
the public-school student population.
The success of Milwaukee’s program has inspired imitators. Today, what was once viewed as a radical idea has been accepted in 
the mainstream, as school choice programs increase in number and participation each year. As of the 2006-07 school year there are 
twelve voucher programs in existence in seven states and the District of Columbia. These programs allow parents to select a private 
school of their choice, using public funds to cover all or part of the student’s tuition. Several of these programs are aimed at special 
student populations, such as disabled students, foster children or low-income students. Together, these programs allowed more than 
50,000 students to attend private schools in 2005-06.
In addition, there are six tax-credit scholarship programs in fi ve states. These programs allow either individuals or corporations 
to receive a tax credit for donating money to scholarship granting organizations. These organizations then award scholarships to 
students, which they can use to attend the private schools of their choice. These programs allowed more than 68,000 students to 
attend private schools in 2005-06.
The debate over school choice has been passionate on both sides. Many suggest that allowing parents to choose their child’s school 
is important for providing all students with equal access to educational resources regardless of their ability to pay. This is why 
many school choice programs are focused on low-income or otherwise disadvantaged students. However, there is a more basic ratio-
nale for school choice, which is that the United States is a nation founded on the principle of liberty. Having the freedom to choose a 
school should be considered as normal as having the freedom to choose a doctor. Acceptance of this idea is rapidly gaining ground, 
as the number of school choice programs and participants continues to increase.
As the trend towards more school choice continues, it is worthwhile to assess the fi scal impact of these programs. There is still a 
strong contingent that believes school choice should only be allowed if it can be proven to not have a detrimental fi scal effect on 
the current system of public schools. And Milton Friedman himself didn’t just argue that choice would deliver a better education; 
he also argued that it would save money. Was he right? While there is not yet any truly open system of educational choice operat-
ing in the U.S., we can examine the fi nancial impact of the more limited programs that have been enacted. Are they allowing the 
government to provide education at a reduced cost? This study examines the growing school choice movement and calculates the 
fi scal impact of each school choice program to date.
MILTON & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN FOUNDATION
APRIL 2007  SCHOOL CHOICE ISSUES IN DEPTH  9
SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS 
AND PARTICIPATION
10  SCHOOL CHOICE ISSUES IN DEPTH  APRIL 2007
SCHOOL CHOICE BY THE NUMBERS: THE FISCAL EFFECT OF SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS, 1990-2006
Table 1 tracks the growth of school choice 
since 1990. In the 1990s school choice grew 
steadily, but slowly. The number of pro-
grams was small, and more importantly, 
many of them were operating under leg-
islated participation caps. Thousands of 
students were excluded from these pio-
neering programs because of such arbi-
trary limitations. Over the last six years, 
however, as more states have begun to 
offer school choice to parents, and as 
the participation limits on school choice 
programs have been raised or even elimi-
nated, the number of students receiv-
ing school choice has rapidly expanded. 
There are now a total of 21 school choice 
programs in eleven states and the District 
of Columbia. In the 2005-06 school year 
nearly 110,000 students nationwide were 
using voucher and tax-credit scholarship 
programs created since 1990 to attend a 
private school of their choice. And with 
eight more voucher and tax-credit schol-
arship programs starting in either 2006-07 
or 2007-08, the number of participants can 
only be expected to grow.
In addition, it should be noted that school 
vouchers are not a new practice. Maine 
and Vermont both have long-standing 
voucher programs in the form of “town 
tuitioning,” a practice going back to the 
19th century. Students in small towns that 
don’t have public schools at their grade 
level are sent to neighboring schools at 
public expense. Students can choose ei-
SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAMS 
AND PARTICIPATION
ther public or private schools, so town 
tuitioning is a form of voucher program 
– students can attend private schools us-
ing public funds. More than 6,000 students 
choose private schools through town tu-
itioning in Maine, and about 4,500 in Ver-
mont.
However, the modern school choice move-
ment really began in Milwaukee in the 
1990-91 school year. In its fi rst year this 
program provided 337 vouchers to stu-
dents to attend private secular schools 
in Milwaukee. Local activists fought to 
expand legislated caps on participation, 
and by 1995 the program was providing 
1,320 vouchers. In that year the program 
was expanded to include private religious 
schools. Court challenges held the expan-
sion up until 1998, but once the expansion 
went into effect, participation soared.
In 1995 another program, the Cleveland 
Scholarship and Tutoring Program, 
came into existence. In its fi rst year of 
operation, 1996-97, this program provided 
vouchers to nearly 2,000 children living 
within the Cleveland Municipal School 
District. This more than doubled the 
number of children escaping failed urban 
school systems with vouchers.
In 1998-99 the fi rst tax-credit scholarship 
program was enacted. Arizona’s indi-
vidual tax credit for donations to School 
Tuition Organizations produced suffi cient 
MILTON & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN FOUNDATION
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Table 1
Note: Voucher programs in Maine and Vermont dating to the 19th century are not included here; over 10,000 students attend private schools at public expense each year 
through these programs. Programs in Illinois, Iowa and Minnesota that provide personal tax credits or deductions for educational expenses are also not included; these 
programs make choosing a private school somewhat easier for about 650,000 participating families.
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funds to award 128 scholarships in its fi rst 
year. Although the number more than 
doubled, to 365, the following year, the 
third year of the program saw a tremen-
dous expansion after a court challenge 
to the program had been defeated. There 
were more than 15,000 scholarship recipi-
ents that year.
Florida’s two voucher programs, the 
John M. McKay Scholarship for Students 
with Disabilities and the A+ Opportuni-
ty Scholarship Program for students in 
failing schools, joined the school choice 
movement the next year. While they start-
ed small, with only 59 vouchers in the 
fi rst year, the two programs served more 
than 18,000 in the 2005-06 school year. The 
McKay program, which served 17,300 stu-
dents that year, was the nation’s largest 
voucher program (though it has since 
been overtaken again by Milwaukee’s 
program).
In 2000, Pennsylvania’s Educational Im-
provement program became available, 
providing corporate tax credits for dona-
tions to Scholarship Organizations. This 
was followed by Florida’s Step Up corpo-
rate tax-credit scholarship program two 
years later. In the 2004-05 school year, the 
fi rst federally funded voucher program 
began in Washington, D.C. This program, 
the Opportunity Scholarship program, 
reached its legislated maximum capacity 
of just over 1,800 students in 2006-07. Ohio’s 
Autism Scholarship Program and Utah’s 
Carson Smith Scholarship Program for 
students with special needs became avail-
able in the following few years.
It should be noted that many of these pro-
grams are operating at their maximum 
legislated capacity and that the waiting 
lists are quite extensive. The total num-
ber of parents interested in these pro-
grams is substantially higher than Table 
1 suggest.
In addition to the programs listed above, 
three states – Iowa, Illinois and Minneso-
ta – offer taxpayers a tax credit or deduc-
tion on their personal income taxes for 
education expenses, including expenses 
at private schools. These programs make 
choosing a private school somewhat easi-
er for about 650,000 participating families. 
However, these programs are not included 
in this study, because they are so differ-
ent from vouchers and tax-credit scholar-
ships, and because calculating their fi scal 
impact would be prohibitively diffi cult.
In the 2006-07 school year seven new 
school choice programs were to begin 
operation, a higher number than in any 
previous year. Some of these programs 
are vouchers and others are tax-credit 
scholarships. Some will not actually pro-
vide vouchers or scholarships until the 
fall of 2007, because they began opera-
tion after the start of the school year in 
2006. The most important of these is the 
nation’s fi rst universal voucher program, 
enacted in Utah in early 2007 and set to 
begin operations in fall 2007. The Parent 
Choice in Education Program will offer 
school vouchers to roughly 97 percent of 
the state’s students. And since all new 
kindergartners are eligible, the program 
will be truly universal by 2020. The dollar 
amounts of the voucher are on a sliding 
scale by income and are on the low side 
– $3,000 for students eligible for free and 
reduced lunch programs, gradually de-
clining down to $500 for wealthy students. 
But this program is still a tremendous 
breakthrough for Milton Friedman’s vi-
sion of school choice, and provides hope 
that a true educational marketplace will 
soon be opened up.
THE FISCAL IMPACT
OF SCHOOL CHOICE
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If a state 
spends $6,000 
per student in 
public schools 
and offers a 
$5,000 voucher, 
every student 
who uses a 
voucher saves 
the state 
$1,000.
THE FISCAL IMPACT OF 
SCHOOL CHOICE
The growth of school choice programs is 
changing how education is funded. On a 
limited basis, these programs are shift-
ing control of a portion of public funding 
from the public school system to parents. 
In nearly every case, the portion given to 
parents represents only a fraction of the 
total funding per student.
In most states, a certain amount of rev-
enue is allocated for each student, often 
referred to as the “formula” amount (it is 
also sometimes called the “base” or “foun-
dation” amount). This is the amount that 
the state legislature has determined is re-
quired to cover the basic day-to-day costs 
of educating each child.3  The determina-
tion of the formula funding tied to each 
student is often incredibly complex, with 
multiple layers, acronyms, and indices 
that very few people understand. However, 
the basic outline of the system is straight-
forward: each school district is allocated 
an amount of funding based on its total 
enrollment and the state’s level of formula 
funding per student. This total amount of 
formula funding is then split between the 
district and the state according to each 
district’s ability to pay – wealthier districts 
are expected to shoulder a larger portion 
of their own funding from local revenue, 
while in poorer districts the state picks up 
a larger share of the funding. The method 
of determining each district’s ability to 
pay varies from state to state, but is gener-
ally based on either the relative property 
value or income level in each district. 
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The three main sources of school funding 
– federal, state, and local – are all affect-
ed differently by school choice. School 
choice programs typically redirect some 
or all of the state portion of school fund-
ing. State departments of education can 
pass the entire state portion of funding 
on to parents, rather than the district, 
with no fi scal effect to the state. The state 
spends the same amount either way. And 
if only a portion of state funding is redi-
rected, as is often the case, the state can 
simply pocket the difference as a fi scal 
benefi t. For example, if a state spends 
$6,000 per student in public schools and 
offers a $5,000 voucher, every student who 
uses a voucher saves the state $1,000.
Although our analysis will examine only 
the state savings from formula revenue 
per student, any school choice partici-
pants who qualify for various supplemen-
tal state programs, such as programs for 
disadvantaged students or gifted students, 
would have a higher total amount of state 
aid associated with them. As a result, the 
actual savings to the state from school 
choice programs will be greater than our 
analysis indicates. 
The redirection of state formula revenue 
to parents does not generally affect the 
local or federal revenue going to a public 
school district. Federal revenue for edu-
cation is received by districts either as 
direct grants or as grants passed through 
the state. Most of these grants, such as 
Title I of the No Child Left Behind Act 
and the national school lunch program, 
are designed to increase the educational 
resources of disadvantaged students. The 
formulas for determining the amount of 
federal funds a district receives through 
these programs are based in part on the 
number of disadvantaged students living 
within the district’s boundaries, as deter-
mined by the U.S. Census. Since students 
using school choice do not change resi-
dence, school choice will not affect fed-
eral revenue for public schools. What’s 
more, federal funding levels generally do 
not change much even when the number 
of disadvantaged students in a district 
changes, thanks to hold-harmless provi-
sions, small state provisions, set-asides 
and discretionary provisions at both the 
state and district level. 
Local public education revenue is gener-
ally raised by property taxes. In some 
cases, school boards are able to set their 
own tax rates and collect the amount of 
revenue they determine is necessary. In 
other cases, the school board must go to 
a local governing board, such as a city 
council or county board of supervisors, 
and request their school budget from the 
total property taxes collected – meaning 
that education competes with other pub-
lic services for local revenue.
Either way, local funding usually does not 
have a defi ned, enrollment-based formula 
driving it, so local revenue is likely to be 
affected only by especially large changes 
in enrollment. School choice programs 
therefore do not generally remove any lo-
cal funds from public schools, even though 
students and their associated costs are 
being removed from those schools. This 
means that when a student leaves a pub-
lic school using a voucher, the school’s 
costs go down by one student’s worth, but 
its revenue goes down by less than one 
student’s worth. The difference is quite 
substantial – in most states, local fund-
ing makes up over 35 percent of all school 
revenue. This effect provides a fi nancial 
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windfall for public schools. However, 
some school choice programs do redirect 
local revenue as well as state revenue.
While public education revenue is deter-
mined by state formulas, politics or a 
combination of both, a school district’s 
expenditures are governed by the super-
intendent and the school board, within 
legal and accounting boundaries. Total 
expenditures, naturally, are normally 
limited to total revenue.
When enrollment changes, there should 
be an accompanying change in so-called 
“current” expenditures. Current expendi-
tures are the operating expenditures for a 
given year; they do not include long-term 
expenses such as building costs or bond 
payments. While all current expenditures 
will be reduced by the departure of stu-
dents, in order to keep this analysis as 
conservative as possible we assume that 
the change in expenditures will be lim-
ited to instructional expenses. This is the 
subcategory of current expenditures that 
includes only the classroom expense, not 
transportation, lunch programs, adminis-
tration or other non-instructional support 
services and expenditures. This minimiz-
es our calculation of the reduction in dis-
trict costs when a student leaves. The ac-
tual savings to local school districts from 
school choice programs will therefore be 
larger than our analysis suggests.
We make this conservative assumption 
to ensure that our analysis takes into ac-
count the widespread complaints brought 
by school choice opponents about fi xed 
costs. Opponents of vouchers argue that 
giving parents control of any amount of 
public education funding hurts public 
schools, because public schools are not 
able to reduce their costs suffi ciently 
when a student leaves with a voucher.
These complaints are badly overblown. 
Public school districts adjust their ex-
penditures to meet changes in enroll-
ment whenever students enter or leave a 
school district, regardless of the reason. 
Enrollment levels in school districts are 
constantly shifting from year to year, 
Instructional Spending Per Student Has Consistently Increased in 
Every State and District Affected by School Choice
Figure 1
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and districts respond by changing their 
spending levels. Many urban districts 
have faced declining enrollment for years 
and have reduced their workforces and 
building stocks accordingly. Similarly, 
districts with growing enrollment build 
more schools and hire more teachers 
every year. There is no reason school 
districts should fi nd it more diffi cult to 
respond to changes in enrollment due to 
school choice than to all the other exist-
ing causes of enrollment change.
However, because of these complaints, it 
has become the standard practice for fi s-
cal analyses of school choice programs 
to make some accommodation for fi xed 
costs. To keep our analysis conserva-
tive, we have not only excluded from our 
analysis all reductions in costs outside 
the category of current expenditures, but 
we have even excluded all reductions in 
current expenditure costs other than in-
structional costs. By assuming that only 
instructional expenditures are affected 
by changes in enrollment, we provide 
the maximum leeway for the role of fi xed 
costs.
In fact, our data show that per-student in-
structional expenditures have uniformly 
increased in all the districts and states 
affected by school choice programs (see 
Figure 1). This shows that, even with the 
redirection of some revenue to parental 
control under school choice programs, 
states and districts were able to spend 
more on the students that remained in 
the public schools.
To summarize: for each school choice 
program, our analysis assumes that when 
a student receives a voucher the local 
public school district will lose the state 
formula revenue associated with that stu-
dent, while federal and local revenue will 
be unchanged. This loss of revenue will 
be offset by a reduction of public educa-
tion expenses equal to the instructional 
expenditures per student for that year. 
The fi scal impact for the state will be 
the difference between the total amount 
spent on the vouchers or scholarships and 
the total amount of formula funding that 
would otherwise have been spent on the 
students using them. Statewide averages 
will be used for all programs other than 
city-based programs in Milwaukee, Cleve-
land and Washington, D.C., where local 
averages will be used. The particular 
components of each state funding system 
or voucher program will be accounted for 
as well. For example, where the cost of a 
voucher program is shared between state 
and local governments, we adjust our cost 
calculations accordingly.
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Arizona has been proactive on the school choice front. It enacted the fi rst tax-credit scholarship program, for individual 
taxpayers, in 1997. In the 2005-06 legislative session, Arizona passed two new voucher programs, one for disabled students 
and one for students in foster care, as well as a tax-credit scholarship program for corporate taxpayers. These four pro-
grams could realistically offer more than 30,000 vouchers and scholarships to students in Arizona for the 2007-08 school 
year. Within a few years they will likely serve more than 5 percent of the roughly 900,000 school children in Arizona.
Arizona’s public education funding system is known as Base Equalization funding. There are four components to the 
formula – basic support, transportation, soft capital (desks and books) and capital outlay (buildings).4  Each of these 
funding components multiplies a set amount by the average daily attendance of a district to determine the funding level 
for that district.5  
Formula aid has been declining as a percentage of total state funding per student over the last decade in Arizona. In 
1998-99, 92 percent of all state funding for schools was formula aid; by 2003-04, only 74 percent was. This has not been an 
uncommon trend, as legislatures have increasingly prioritized categorical programs over formula aid. Unfortunately, it 
means state funding is less directly associated with the level of enrollment in each local district.
To determine the savings for the Arizona state education budget from school choice, we consider only the formula portion 
of the state funding per student. This is appropriate, as this is the portion of the budget that would change as enrollment 
in public schools changes.
The only Arizona program whose fi scal impact can be calculated is the school tuition organization individual tax credit; 
the other three programs are too new to analyze. To determine the effect this program has had on state funding, we fi rst 
determine the difference between the formula revenue per student and the average scholarship amount for each year 
of the program’s existence, and multiply this difference by the number of scholarships awarded in that year to students 
who had previously been in public schools. Then we add to this the average scholarship amount for each year multiplied 
by the number of scholarships awarded in that year to students who were already in private schools.
Because the program awards some scholarships to students who are already attending private schools, it is necessary for 
us to estimate how many participants fall into this category. These students do not generate savings from reduced pub-
lic school expenditures. We estimate the percentage of participants who would probably have attended a public school 
prior to receiving a scholarship using an estimate of the price elasticity of demand for a private school education. The 
price elasticity of demand tells us the change in the percentage of people who purchase something (in this case, private 
schooling) when its price changes by 1 percent. Since school choice effectively reduces the price of private schooling, the 
price elasticity of demand for private schooling allows us to estimate how many new students will migrate from public 
to private schools based on the dollar value of the scholarships. The most recent research on price elasticity of demand 
for private schooling suggests that for each 1 percent decline in tuition costs, private school enrollment will increase by 
1.32 percentage points.6  We applied this price elasticity of demand to the average scholarship amounts for each year and 
the average cost of private school tuition.7  This allows us to estimate the number of students who would leave private 
schools if the program were discontinued.
In the eight years it has been in existence, Arizona’s individual tax credit program has cost the state about $29 million 
(see Table 2). This is equal to approximately $250 per scholarship awarded. If the average scholarship amount continues 
to increase over time, however, a greater proportion of participants will be public school students moving to private 
schools with scholarships, improving the program’s fi scal impact on the state.
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Arizona’s Personal Tax-Credit Scholarships Have Saved $18 Million
Table 2
State Total
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
Total Amount of 
Donations
$1,816,799
$13,781,341
$17,701,284
$24,924,656
$26,171,191
$29,445,494
$31,871,900
$42,191,748
Number of 
Scholarships
 128 
 365 
 15,081 
 18,049 
 19,559 
 20,134 
 21,146 
 22,522 
Estimated 
Public School 
Students 
Receiving 
Scholarships
36
79
4,261
4,824
6,367
6,636
7,294
7,598
Estimated 
Private School 
Students 
Receiving 
Scholarships
92
286
10,820
13,225
13,192
13,498
13,852
14,924
Average 
Scholarship
$811
$653
$899
$893
$1,142
$1,214
$1,334
$1,370
Average State 
Formula 
Spending per 
Student
$2,667
$2,745
$2,840
$2,868
$2,771
$3,087
$2,857
$2,8578
Difference 
Between State 
Formula 
Spending 
and Average 
Scholarship
$1,856
$2,092
$1,941
$1,975
$1,629
$1,873
$1,523
$1,487
State Savings 
From Public 
School Students 
Receiving 
Scholarships
$66,933
$164,531
$8,268,975
$9,528,893
$10,374,695
$12,426,431
$11,104,762
$11,294,604
State Savings 
From Private 
School Students 
Receiving 
Scholarships
$74,564
$186,984
$9,727,154
$11,809,601
$15,064,863
$16,386,588
$18,478,887
$20,445,727
State Budget 
Fiscal 
Impact
($7,631)
($22,453)
($1,458,179)
($2,280,708)
($4,690,168)
($3,960,157)
($7,374,126)
($9,151,123)
($28,944,544)
Number of 
Donations
4,248
32,023
38,249
46,755
52,161
58,122
63,830
69,232
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
Estimated Public 
School Students 
Receiving 
Scholarships
 36 
 79 
 4,261 
 4,824 
 6,367 
 6,636 
 7,294 
 7,598 
Average 
Instructional 
Spending per 
Student 
$3,144
$3,328
$3,416
$3,868
$4,065
$4,141
$4,381
$4,635
Average State 
Formula 
Spending per 
Student
$2,667
$2,745
$2,840
$2,868
$2,771
$3,087
$2,857
$2,8579 
Difference Between 
State Formula 
Spending and 
Instructional Spending
$477
$583
$576
$1,000
$1,294
$1,054
$1,525
$1,779
Local Total
Combined Total
 Public School 
Districts 
Fiscal Impact
$17,194
$45,868
$2,456,034
$4,823,585
$8,237,072
$6,997,101
$11,119,980
$13,516,434
$47,213,269
$18,268, 725
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We turn now to the program’s impact on local public school districts. Instructional expenditures are reduced when public 
school students receive scholarships. As indicated in Table 2, these cost savings substantially outweigh the reduction 
in state funding received by local public school districts, producing a net fi scal gain for local public school districts in 
Arizona totaling $47 million. In reality, the savings are likely to be much larger, both because of the conservative as-
sumptions in our analysis (discussed above), and because most of the scholarship students come from disadvantaged 
backgrounds and require larger educational expenditures than the average student requires.
As Arizona implements its two new voucher programs and its new corporate tax-credit scholarship program, the addi-
tional savings generated are likely to be substantial.
Like Arizona, Florida was an early entrant to the school choice movement. The school choice programs that it has of-
fered to date target particular types of students. The McKay Scholarship Program is a voucher program for students 
with disabilities, the A+ Opportunity Scholarship Program is a voucher program for students in chronically failing 
schools, and the state also has a corporate tax-credit scholarship program for low-income students. In the 2005-06 school 
year more than 31,500 students in Florida received vouchers and scholarships from these three programs. Although this 
represents only 1.2 percent of Florida’s 2.5 million students, the state has been a school choice leader.
Florida’s public education funding system is known as the Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP).10  The FEFP 
uses a foundation funding amount per student, the Base Student Allocation (BSA), and multiplies this by the weighted 
number of full-time equivalent students in each district.11  The weights are mainly based on student grade levels, with 
add-on weights for severe special needs, English language learners and vocational students. In addition to the BSA there 
are several categorical programs, the funding of which is determined according to separate formulas. The total FEFP 
amount for each district is then divided between the state and the district according to the district’s ability to pay, as 
determined by property values and legislatively determined tax rates. So the total FEFP amount represents both state 
and local funding. The state’s FEFP spending rose from 76 percent of total state spending in 1999-2000 to 85 percent in 
2003-04.
A+ Opportunity Scholarship Program
The A+ Opportunity Scholarship Program was established in 1999 and offered students in chronically failing schools the 
opportunity to attend a private school of their choice with school vouchers. To be considered chronically failing, a school 
had to have received a state rating of “F” for two consecutive years, based on its scores on the Florida Comprehensive 
Assessment Test. In 2006, the Florida Supreme Court struck down the A+ program. Since then, students who were previ-
ously receiving A+ vouchers have been made eligible to receive scholarships through Florida’s tax-credit scholarship 
program (see below).
During the seven years that this program was in existence, students received vouchers that averaged between $3,000 and 
$4,100 each. In each year, the average voucher amount exceeded state formula spending per student, and the growth in 
the average voucher amount was greater than the growth in the state FEFP spending per student. However, districts 
had the total voucher amounts for their students deducted from their state aid. Therefore, the program resulted in a 
total savings to the state of about $2 million (see Table 3). This represents the difference between what the state paid for 
vouchers and what it would have paid for the same students in FEFP aid to public schools. 
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Although the A+ program reduced state aid to local public school districts, the average instructional spending per stu-
dent in Florida was greater than this amount for each year of the program’s existence. This created a net fi scal savings 
for school districts. Over seven years, their total net savings was about $1 million (see Table 3). 
McKay Scholarship Program
The McKay program is slightly more complicated to analyze than most other voucher programs. Its participants are 
disabled students, and these students require additional educational resources. Thus, in addition to state FEFP spend-
Florida’s A+ Vouchers Saved $3 Million
Table 3
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
 Number of Vouchers
57
51
47
556
640
763
734
Total Amount of 
Vouchers
 $175,205 
 $176,900 
 $155,494 
 $2,058,600 
 $2,546,850 
 $3,126,618 
 $2,982,448 
Average Voucher
$3,074
$3,469
$3,308
$3,703
$3,979
$4,098
$4,063
Average State Formula 
Spending per Student
$2,934
$3,091
$2,986
$3,081
$3,230
$3,378
$3,446
Difference Between 
State Spending 
per Student and 
Average Voucher
$140
$378
$322
$622
$749
$720
$617
State Total
State Budget 
Fiscal Impact
 $1,967
 $19,259
 $15,152
 $345,564
 $479,650
 $549,204
 $453,084
$1,869,880
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
Difference Between 
Average Voucher and 
Instructional Spending
$639
$394
$630
$367
$321
$325
$485
Average Voucher
$3,074
$3,469
$3,308
$3,703
$3,979
$4,098
$4,063
Average  Instructional 
Spending per Student 
 $ 3,712 
 $ 3,863 
 $ 3,939 
 $ 4,070 
 $ 4,301 
 $ 4,423 
 $ 4,548 
 Number of Vouchers
57
51
47
556
640
763
734
 Public School Districts 
Fiscal Impact
$36,399
$20,090
$29,625
$204,310
$205,483
$247,834
$355,907
$1,099,648
$2,969,528
Local Total
Combined Total
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ing, the state’s portion of funding for Exceptional Student Education (ESE) and ESE transportation programs must be 
considered. There is substantial variation in the amount of funding associated with each disabled student, so we cannot 
calculate the effect on state fi nances without more data than we possess. However, the amount of the voucher is limited 
to actual spending that the student would have generated in public school, so the worst possible case is that the program 
is revenue neutral for the state. If students do not use the full amount of the voucher because their private school tuition 
is less than this amount, then the program would generate a savings for the state. 
However, we can calculate the fi scal impact on local public school districts. Florida’s average instructional expenditures 
for exceptional students are known to have exceeded the average McKay voucher amount for each year.12  As the pro-
gram has grown, the annual cost savings to school districts have grown to more than $40 million per year, totaling $139 
million over seven years (see Table 4). It is likely that, as more parents choose to exercise choice through this program, 
the savings will grow.
Corporate Tax-Credit Scholarships
Finally, Florida’s corporate tax-credit scholarship program has provided scholarships of up to $3,500 to eligible students 
since 2002. Students must have family incomes of no more than 185 percent of federal poverty guidelines to participate. 
While $3,500, the scholarship limit set by the legislation creating the program, is more than the state portion of FEFP 
spending per student, the dollar amount of the scholarships has been constant over the four years of the program’s ex-
istence while the state’s FEFP spending per student has increased. By 2005-06 the two amounts were virtually even, and 
by 2006-07 the program is probably resulting in a savings to the state (see Table 5).
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Florida’s McKay Vouchers Have Saved $139 Million
Table 4
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
 Number of 
Vouchers
2
970
5,013
9,130
13,739
15,910
17,300
Total Amount of 
Vouchers
 $3,525 
 $5,883,636 
 $27,843,446 
 $53,320,966 
 $81,755,700 
 $97,276,718 
 $107,686,252 
Average Voucher
$1,763
$6,066
$6,634
$6,769
$6,814
$6,835
 $6,926 
Average 
Instructional 
Spending per 
Exceptional Student 
$7,092
$7,726
$7,991
$8,500
$8,910
$9,462
$9,462
Difference Between 
Average Voucher and 
Instructional Spending
$5,329
$1,660
$1,357
$1,731
$2,096
$2,627
$2,536
Total
 Public School 
Districts 
Fiscal Impact 
$10,658
$1,610,200
$6,802,641
$15,804,030
$28,796,944
$41,795,570
$43,872,800
 $138,692,843
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Florida’s Corporate Tax-Credit Scholarships Have Saved $42 Million
Table 5
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
 Number of 
Scholarships 
 15,585 
 11,550 
 10,473 
 13,497 
Total Amount of 
Scholarships
$50,000,000
$40,000,000
$36,655,500
$47,239,500
Average 
Scholarship
$3,500
$3,500
$3,500
$3,500
Average State 
Formula Spending 
per Student
$3,081
$3,230
$3,378
$3,446
Difference Between State 
Spending per Student and 
Average Scholarship
($419)
($270)
($122)
($54)
State Total
State Budget 
Fiscal Impact
($6,530,115)
($3,118,500)
($1,277,706)
($728,838)
($11,655,159)
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
 Public School Districts 
Fiscal Impact 
$15,413,281
$12,364,503
$10,940,210
$14,875,964
$53,593,957
$41,938,798
Difference Between State 
Formula Spending and 
Instructional Spending
$989
$1,071
$1,045
$1,102
Average State 
Formula 
Spending per 
Student
$3,081
$3,230
$3,378
$3,446
 Instructional Spending 
per Student 
$4,070
$4,301
$4,423
$4,548
 Number of 
Scholarships 
 15,585 
 11,550 
 10,473 
 13,497 
Local Total
Combined Total
As with Florida’s other school choice programs, the state formula revenue lost by districts through the corporate tax-
credit scholarship program is less than the amount that local districts would have had to spend for the basic instructional 
needs of the participating students had they remained in public schools. The total savings to local public districts over 
the four years of the program is more than $53 million (see Table 5).  
The combined fi scal impact of the three Florida school choice programs indicates an increase in state education costs of 
$10 million. However, this increase is dwarfed by a total savings to local public school districts of $194 million. This net 
savings of nearly $184 million occurred even as parents’ options and overall satisfaction increased.13 
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Iowa’s individual tax-credit scholarship program, enacted in 2006, will begin offering scholarships to students in the 
2007-08 school year. This program allows individuals to take a credit against their income taxes worth 65 percent of their 
donation to a School Tuition Organization. Since passage of the legislation, several School Tuition Organizations have 
been formed. In the fi rst year, the amount of funds available to each organization will be dependent upon the share of 
school enrollment covered by the geographic area that they represent.14  After that, funds will be apportioned based on 
enrollment at the private schools served by each organization. In 2006, $2.5 million in tax credits were available; fundrais-
ing efforts met this limit within only a few months. In 2007, the limit increases to a total of $5 million.
We do not know how many scholarships may be offered in the next school year, or the average amount of these scholar-
ships. However, Iowa bases its public education funding on a legislatively-determined “Cost per Student,” plus an annual 
allowable growth percentage. This foundation amount was $4,931 for the 2005-06 school year. The program will create net 
savings for the state as long as the average scholarship is less than this amount. Similarly, the average instructional 
expenditure per student for 2003-04 (the latest year for which fi gures are available) was $4,923.15  Any difference between 
the state formula revenue and this number will generate cost savings at the local level.
Since 1873, Maine has practiced “town tuitioning.” This form of school voucher allows students in small towns without 
public schools at their grade level to attend nearby public or private schools at public expense. In 2004-05, the most recent 
year for which data are available, 13,959 students participated, of whom 6,052 chose private schools.
Our analysis considers town tuitioning to be revenue neutral. The towns in which the students reside must pay tuition for 
them to attend schools of their choice regardless of whether they choose public or private schools (Maine public schools 
charge tuition for students they receive through tuitioning). Therefore, when parents choose to attend private schools 
rather than public schools they have not fundamentally changed the fi scal situation. We could calculate the difference 
between the existing tuition rates at public schools and private schools if we had the necessary data, and call that the 
fi scal impact of the program. However, since we lack the necessary data for such an analysis, and the towns are paying 
tuition to schools of choice either way, it is appropriate to treat town tuitioning as revenue neutral.
Like Arizona and Florida, Ohio adopted school choice early in the history of the movement, and has become a bellwether 
state for school choice. Cleveland is the home of the second modern voucher program, and Ohio now has a total of three 
school voucher programs – more voucher programs than any other state, and behind only Arizona (with its two voucher 
programs and two tax-credit scholarship programs) for the total number of school choice programs in the state.
Cleveland Scholarship and Tuitioning Program
In March 1995, the Ohio General Assembly enacted legislation that allowed up to 1,500 low-income students in the Cleve-
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land Municipal School District to receive vouchers of up $2,250 to attend private schools of their choice. The legislation 
originally allowed up to 50 percent of the recipients to be students who were already attending private schools, though 
that number was subsequently lowered to 25 percent.16  The program survived a stiff court challenge that went all the 
way to the U.S. Supreme Court, where it was upheld in a landmark decision. Its participation limits have been repeatedly 
expanded; in the 2004-05 school year it provided 5,675 vouchers worth up to $3,450 each.
Up to 25 percent of voucher recipients could have attended private schools before they received vouchers. Since the dollar 
value of the Cleveland voucher is not very high relative to other programs, it will be less effective at inducing migration 
from  public schools to private schools. We will assume that a full quarter of participating students – the maximum al-
lowed by law – are students who would have attended private school anyway. Even with this conservative assumption, 
the Cleveland voucher program generates a small net savings to the state. Over the last nine years, the total net savings 
are just over $83,000 (see Table 6). 
The instructional spending per student in Cleveland public schools has been greater than the state formula revenue that 
the district would have received for the students in the program had they remained in public schools, so every public 
school student who leaves with a voucher generates a savings for the Cleveland Municipal School District. Even with the 
conservative assumption that only 75 percent of participating students would have attended public schools without the 
program, the school district has still saved more than $61 million since the program’s inception (see Table 6).
Autism Scholarship Program
In additional to the Cleveland voucher program, Ohio provides up to $20,000 in state funding for privately provided educa-
tion services, including private school tuition, for students with autism. Assessing the fi scal impact of the Autism Schol-
arship Program is diffi cult, as autism ranges in severity from very mild to very severe, meaning that private school costs 
for these students will also vary considerably. To make matters worse, Ohio school districts do not currently report data 
on instructional spending for autistic students.17  Since Ohio does not make suffi cient data available, we cannot calculate 
the program’s fi scal impact on local public school districts.
We can, however, calculate its fi scal effect on the state of Ohio. Funding for disabled students in Ohio uses weights for the 
various categories of special needs. For example, a disabled student receiving a weight of 2.5 would generate special educa-
tion funding for the local school district equal to two and a half times the foundation funding level for one regular student. 
Students with autism receive a weight of 4.735 for their Basic Aid portion of the formula revenue. In addition, these students 
are counted in the general enrollment and generate funds that way as well. Determining the formula revenue associated with 
an autistic student requires multiplying the foundation amount ($5,169 in 2005 and $5,283 in 2006) by 5.735. This gives us the 
total funding burden that is shared between the state and the local districts. We multiply this by the local share percentage 
(which is 0.68) to determine how much is funded locally. What is left over after this local share is subtracted is the average 
state formula spending per student. The results of the calculations for 2005-06 and 2006-07 are shown in Table 7. 
Even though the program serves very few students, and even if we make the conservative assumption that each student 
uses the maximum voucher amount of $20,000, the Ohio Autism Scholarship Program has generated $1 million in savings 
for the state.
Educational Choice Scholarship Program
Finally, Ohio has implemented the Educational Choice Scholarship Program, which provides school vouchers for stu-
dents assigned to public schools that have been designated as being in a state of “academic watch” or “academic emer-
gency” for two of the last three years. While it is too early to assess the fi scal impact of the program, it should be noted 
that the dollar amount of the scholarship, $4,250 for students in grades K-8 and $5,000 for high school students, is less 
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Cleveland Vouchers Have Saved $61 Million
Table 6
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
Estimated 
Private 
School 
Students 
Receiving 
Vouchers
499
729
919
852
949
1,131
1,320
1,472
1,419
Average 
Voucher 
Amount
 $2,488 
 $2,904 
 $1,879 
 $2,029 
 $2,017 
 $2,199 
 $2,342 
 $2,786 
 $2,686 
Average State 
Formula 
Spending per 
Student
$1,934
$2,213
$2,660
$2,900
$3,205
$3,351
$3,504
$3,656
$3,750
Difference 
Between State 
Formula 
Spending 
and Average 
Voucher
($554)
($691)
$781 
$871 
$1,188 
$1,152 
$1,162 
$870 
$1,064 
Estimated 
Public School 
Students 
Receiving 
Vouchers
1,496
2,186
2,756
2,555
2,848
3,392
3,959
4,415
4,256
State Savings 
from Public 
School 
Students 
Receiving 
Vouchers
 ($828,471)
($1,509,123)
 $2,151,490 
 $2,224,169 
 $3,382,947 
 $3,906,733 
 $4,598,082 
 $3,839,961 
 $4,529,029 
State Cost 
from Private 
School 
Students 
Receiving 
Vouchers
 $1,240,305 
 $2,115,490 
 $1,725,811 
 $1,727,712 
 $1,914,347 
 $2,486,535 
 $3,090,564 
 $4,100,472 
 $3,810,330 
State Budget 
Fiscal 
Impact
 ($2,068,776)
 ($3,624,613)
 $425,679 
 $496,458 
 $1,468,601 
 $1,420,1999 
 $1,507,518 
 ($260,511)
 $718,700 
 $83,255 State Total
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
Public School 
District 
Fiscal Impact
$4,243,072
$3,295,715
$4,960,586
$4,060,507
$4,779,954
$7,186,003
$9,017,736
$11,028,306
$12,588,455
$61,160,333
Difference Between 
State Formula 
Spending and 
Instructional Spending
$2,837
$1,508
$1,800
$1,590
$1,679
$2,118
$2,278
$2,498
$2,958
Average 
Instructional 
Spending per 
Student
$4,771
$3,721
$4,460
$4,489
$4,883
$5,469
$5,782
$6,154
$6,707
Average State Formula 
Spending per Student
$1,934
$2,213
$2,660
$2,900
$3,205
$3,351
$3,504
$3,656
$3,750
Number of Vouchers
1,496
2,186
2,756
2,555
2,848
3,392
3,959
4,415
4,256
Local Total
Combined Total   $61,243,588
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than the state’s average instructional expenditures, which were $5,610 in 2003-04 and have almost certainly increased 
since then. Therefore, it is likely that the 2,272 students receiving vouchers in 2006-07 are creating a net fi scal benefi t to 
their local districts. The program’s fi scal impact on the state would require a more detailed calculation for which the 
necessary data are not yet available.
Pennsylvania’s legacy in the school choice movement is the passage of the fi rst corporate tax-credit scholarship pro-
gram. This legislation, enacted in 2001, allows corporations to take a credit equal to 75 percent of a donation to a Scholar-
ship Organization, or 90 percent if the company commits to making the donation two years in a row, up to a maximum 
credit of $200,000. In the 2006-07 school year more than 32,000 students were receiving vouchers through this program and, 
to date, more than 1,900 companies have pledged well over $100 million in donations.18  
Unfortunately, Pennsylvania’s public education funding system is not directly based on enrollment, as in most states. 
Rather, the Pennsylvania legislature sets the total funding level for each of its major programs – basic education funding, 
base supplement, poverty supplement, foundation supplement, tax effort supplement, growth supplement, small district 
assistance, and limited English profi ciency supplement. These totals are then allocated among the 500 school districts in 
the state according to their Market Value to Personal Income Aid Ratio (MV/PI AR), with some intervening steps. This 
means that the total public education funding for the state is not necessarily affected by changes in enrollment. No doubt 
a dramatic change in enrollment levels would be noticed and would prompt the legislature to adjust spending accord-
ingly, But it is not clear how large a change would be necessary to get the legislature’s attention, and other factors (such 
as political pressure) will also affect the legislature’s decision. At minimum, we cannot confi dently predict changes in 
total funding based on changes in enrollment. Making matters worse, the Basic Education Funding program contains a 
hold-harmless provision that guarantees each district will always receive at least the level of funding it received in the 
previous year, plus a 3.5 percent increase – regardless of changes in enrollment.19  
Consequently, it would appear that the more than 30,000 students that receive vouchers under the Education Improve-
ment Tax Credit program may not have saved the state any funding. The $161 million in tax credits that Pennsylvania 
PENNSYLVANIA
 Number of Vouchers 
270
490
Maximum Voucher 
Amount
$20,000
$20,000
Average State 
Formula 
Spending  per 
Student
$21,505
$21,238
Difference Between State 
Formula Spending and 
Maximum Voucher
$1,505 
$1,238 
State Budget 
Fiscal Impact
$406,350 
$606,620 
$1,012,970 
Ohio’s Autism Vouchers Have Saved $1 Million
Table 7
2005-06
2006-07
Total
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has offered corporations since the program began six years would, in fact, be in addition to total state public education 
funding.
Local public school districts, however, have greatly benefi ted from this program. The departure of students using scholarships 
would not have caused any of their education funding to decrease, leaving them with the same amount of money for fewer 
students. On the cost side, districts save the instructional expenditures associated with the students receiving scholarships.
As in Arizona, scholarship recipients in Pennsylvania could have attended private school prior to receiving a scholar-
ship. Therefore, it is necessary to estimate how many students would be likely to return to public schools if the schol-
arships were not provided. For the six years this program has existed, we estimate that approximately 30 percent of 
recipients were migrants from public schools to private schools (for the method used to calculate this estimate, see the 
Arizona section).
As shown in Table 8, Pennsylvania’s school districts would have needed to spend an additional $305 million if the public 
school students that received vouchers had remained in their public schools. The entire amount is considered a savings, 
as districts would not have experienced a decrease in revenue when these students left. Even if the additional state funds 
of just over $161 million required for the program are considered, the Educational Improvement Tax Credit program has 
created a net savings of more than $144 million since the program began.
Pennsylvania’s Corporate Tax-Credit Scholarships 
Have Saved $144 Million
Table 8
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
Average Instructional 
Spending per Student
$5,728
$5,959
$6,411
$6,680
$6,960
$7,238
Estimated Public School 
Students Receiving 
Scholarships
 6,600 
 6,286 
 7,982 
 8,352 
 7,955 
 9,282 
 Number of 
Scholarships 
 17,732 
 20,649 
 26,444 
 27,261 
 29,651 
 32,200 
Public School District 
Fiscal Impact
$37,804,800
$37,456,571
$51,170,421
$55,792,388
$55,361,973
$67,186,261
$304,772,414
($161,166,000)
$143,606,414
Local Total
State Fiscal Impact
Combined Total
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As of January 2007, Rhode Island students can receive private school scholarships under the new corporate tax credit for 
donations to Scholarship Organizations. Although each corporate donor can receive a credit of up to $100,000, the entire 
program is limited to $1 million, meaning that it could probably offer fewer than 1,000 scholarships per year.
It is too early to assess the fi scal impact of this program. Such a determination will be problematic even later, as Rhode 
Island does not use a funding formula to provide state education aid. In the 2003-04 school year the state share of educa-
tion spending was $5,335 per student. Any average scholarship below this amount should save the state money, and since 
tax-credit scholarships are generally well below $2,000 on average in other states this will probably be the case in Rhode 
Island. However, because Rhode Island’s school revenue per student is determined annually through the budget process 
without a foundation formula, it might go up or down at any time. Rhode Island is currently considering a switch to a 
student-based funding formula.
It is likely that the scholarship program will save local districts money, as the state’s average instructional expenditures 
per student are high compared to the rest of the country. In 2003-04, they were $7,930. Consequently, local districts would 
realize large savings as public school students migrated to private schools. 
Utah is a recent entrant to the school choice movement, adopting its fi rst program about two years ago. However, it has 
made up for lost time by becoming the fi rst state to adopt a universal voucher program.
In March 2005, Utah created its fi rst school choice program, the Carson Smith Scholarship Program for Students with 
Special Needs, modeled on Florida’s McKay Scholarship Program. It allows the parent of any disabled student to receive 
a voucher of $3,625.50 if the student receives fewer than three hours per day of special needs instruction, or $6,042.50 if 
the student receives more than three hours per day. While there are more than 50,000 students in the state who could be 
eligible to participate in this program, participation is limited by the total amount allocated for the program, which is 
currently $2.5 million annually.
The dollar amount of the vouchers allowed under the Carson Smith program are derived from Utah’s Minimum School 
Program (MSP) funding formulas. The MSP determines state funding for each district based on the district’s weighted 
pupil units (WPUs). Each student is considered to be a single WPU, except for kindergartners, who are 0.55 WPUs. Spe-
cial needs students receive a WPU of 1.5 if they receive fewer than three hours per day of special education instruction, 
and 2.5 if they receive more than three hours. The dollar value of the voucher is equal to the formula funding generated 
by the participating students – that is, the state’s funding amount per WPU times either 1.5 or 2.5. The funding amount 
per WPU was set by the legislature at $2,417 for the 2006-07 school year.
By limiting the voucher amount to the formula funding for a student, Utah has created a program that is revenue neu-
tral for the state. The state treasury spends the same amount on each student’s voucher as it would have spent on that 
student in public school. As for the impact on local public school districts, it is likely that the loss of state revenue for 
RHODE ISLAND
UTAH
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students who use the voucher is much less than their reduction in costs. Unfortunately, reliable expenditure data on spe-
cial education students in Utah are not available. The National Center for Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data 
indicates that Utah instructional expenditures were $3,451 per student in 2003-04; if we were to rely on the assumption 
implicit in the state’s funding formula – namely, that special education students require either one and a half or two and 
a half times the spending of a regular student – we could conclude that special education students in Utah cost either 
$5,177 or $12,943 to educate. In both cases, the vouchers of $3,625.50 or $6,042.50 would create substantial cost savings for 
school districts.
In February 2007, Utah became the fi rst state in the nation with a universal voucher program. The Parent Choice in Edu-
cation Program offers a voucher to every student in public schools, every student in private school whose family income 
is below 185 percent of federal poverty guidelines, and every new kindergarten student. Since fewer than 5 percent of 
Utah students attend private schools, roughly 97 percent of the state’s students already qualify for vouchers; the provi-
sion making new kindergarten students eligible will raise the percentage to 100 by 2020. The dollar value of the voucher 
is on a sliding scale by income; families below 185 percent of federal poverty guidelines get $3,000, and the amount is 
reduced as families get less poor, to a minimum of $500 for wealthy families. 
The program does not begin until fall 2007. However, with such low voucher amounts and such a small number of private 
school students eligible, the state will almost certainly save a substantial amount of money. And since Utah’s instruction-
al expenditures per student are higher than its state formula funding amount (see above), local public school districts 
will also realize a savings on every student who uses these vouchers. A recent study calculated that the program could 
be expected to save the state about $700,000 each year, and save local public school districts $26 million each year.
Since 1869, Vermont has practiced “town tuitioning.” This form of school voucher allows students in small towns without 
public schools at their grade level to attend nearby public or private schools at public expense. In 2004-05, the most recent 
year for which data are available, 8,040 students participated, of whom 4,445 chose private schools.
Our analysis considers town tuitioning to be revenue neutral. The towns in which the students reside must pay tuition 
for them to attend schools of their choice regardless of whether they choose public or private schools (Vermont public 
schools charge tuition for students they receive through tuitioning). Therefore, when parents choose to attend private 
schools rather than public schools they have not fundamentally changed the fi scal situation. We could calculate the dif-
ference between the existing tuition rates at public schools and private schools if we had the necessary data, and call 
that the fi scal impact of the program. However, since we lack the necessary data for such an analysis, and the towns are 
paying tuition to schools of choice either way, it is appropriate to treat town tuitioning as revenue neutral.
The Washington, D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program is the only federally funded school choice program in the nation. 
Signed into law in January 2004, it provides vouchers worth up to $7,500 for low-income students to attend private schools of 
their choice. This program provides another option for parents in the District to leave a school system plagued by extreme-
ly low achievement, crumbling buildings and the one of the highest spending levels per student in the nation. Since charter 
VERMONT
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schools became an option for parents in D.C., enrollment in regular public schools has declined from 77,000 to just over 
50,000. In addition, privately funded school voucher programs have helped D.C. students escape the failing public system.
Although the program offers participants one of the largest dollar amounts of all school choice programs, D.C. public 
school spending per student is also very high. D.C. public schools are funded by a formula that had a foundation level 
of $8,002 in 2006-07. This is the amount that is allocated when students enroll in D.C. public schools, and the amount de-
ducted when they leave. Thus, every student who uses the program produces a positive fi scal impact.
Because the vouchers are paid for by the federal government, not the city government, the city saves the entire founda-
tion amount for every student who leaves public schools for the voucher program. To allow for this unusual situation, we 
fi rst calculated the program’s fi scal impact on the city, and then its total fi scal impact including both the city and the fed-
eral government. The law creating the voucher program also provides for large additional fi nancial grants to D.C. public 
schools, but these grants are not integral to the school choice program and thus are not included in our calculations.
In the fi rst two years of the program, the D.C. voucher program has saved the city more than $25 million in formula 
funding that would have been allocated to D.C. public schools. Factoring in the cost of the vouchers borne by the federal 
government, conservatively assuming that all students used the maximum value, the total fi scal impact of the program 
 Number of Vouchers 
1,027
1,716
 Average Instructional 
Spending per Student 
$9,646
$10,742
Average D.C. Formula 
Spending per Student
$8,532
$9,516
Difference Between 
Formula Spending and 
Instructional Spending
$1,114
$1,226
Public School District 
Fiscal Impact
$1,144,078
$2,103,816
$3,247,894 
$7,767,214
2004-05
2005-06
School District Total
 Number of Vouchers 
1,027
1,716
Average Formula 
Spending per Student
$8,532 
$9,516 
Washington D.C. 
Fiscal Impact
$8,762,364 
$16,329,456 
Maximum 
Voucher Amount
$7,500 
$7,500 
Total Washington D.C. & 
Federal Fiscal Impact
$1,059,864 
$3,459,456 
$4,519,320 
Washington D.C. Vouchers Have Saved $8 Million
Table 9
2004-05
2005-06
City & Federal Total
Combined Total
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on the combined city and federal budgets is about $5 million. The local public school district, the District of Columbia 
Public Schools, has saved more than $3 million over the course of the program because reduced instructional expendi-
tures have outweighed the lost formula revenue for participating students (see Table 9). These savings are in addition to 
the federal grant money that has accompanied the voucher program.20  
The fi nal program we examine is the one that got it all started – the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program. This program 
has been existence for more than sixteen years and provides vouchers to 17,275 Milwaukee students in 2006-07. The dol-
lar value of the voucher is limited to the amount of state equalization aid per student received by the Milwaukee public 
school district in the same year. 
Wisconsin’s “equalization aid” formula is three-tiered, combining spending limits, enrollment levels and the dollar value 
of property per student to determine aid per student. While the system is complicated in practice, funding levels do vary 
with enrollment.
The Milwaukee voucher program contains an unusual funding system that requires the local public school district to bear 
some of the cost of funding the vouchers. Before 1999, the vouchers were funded entirely by the state budget. Because 
the maximum scholarship amount was equal to the state formula funding per student, the program was revenue neutral 
for the state before 1999. Since the 1999-2000 school year, however, the cost of the vouchers has been shared between the 
state and the local school district, Milwaukee Public Schools. In the 1999-00 and 2000-01 school years, the state paid half of 
the cost of the vouchers and the local district paid the other half.  From the 2001-02 school year through the present, the 
state has paid 55 percent of the cost, and the district has paid 45 percent. Thus, since 1999-2000 the program has generated 
substantial savings for the state, because the state has saved the full amount of state formula funding for each student 
who uses a voucher, but has borne only 50 percent or 55 percent of the cost of the vouchers. The total savings to the state 
since 1999 is $217 million (see Table 10).
On the local side, instructional expenditures per student have consistently been approximately $300 larger than state 
formula revenue.21  This means that before 1999, each student receiving a voucher saved the local school district about 
$300. After 1999, however, the district started sharing the cost of the vouchers. The district has responded by raising local 
taxes, so there has been no loss of money to local schools. However, the need to raise taxes is occasioned by the voucher 
program, so this is a negative fi scal impact nonetheless – it reduces the district’s ability to raise taxes for other pur-
poses. The total cost to the local public school district, accounting for both the district’s share of voucher costs and the 
savings realized because reduced instructional spending outweigh reduced state formula funding, has been $188 million 
(see Table 10).
Obviously the requirement that the local public school district share the cost of the voucher program has produced a 
dramatic change in its fi scal impact. Before this requirement was implemented, the program was revenue neutral for the 
state and saved money for the local public school district. The new requirement, however, has generated a large fi scal 
benefi t for the state while imposing an equally large cost on the district. Given that the fi scal effect of the program has 
been changed so drastically by this unusual funding system, it is worth noting that the local school choice movement in 
Milwaukee opposes this system and is working to change it so that local costs will be reduced.
WISCONSIN
MILTON & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN FOUNDATION
APRIL 2007  SCHOOL CHOICE ISSUES IN DEPTH  33
Milwaukee Vouchers Have Saved $28 Million
Table 10
1990-91
1991-92
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
Number of 
Vouchers
337
504
591
718
786
1,320
1,606
1,501
5,740
7,596
9,104
10,391
11,209
12,778
14,427
15,887
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
50%
50%
55%
55%
55%
55%
55%
State Share 
of Voucher 
Funding
$2,446
$2,643
$2,745
$2,985
$3,209
$3,667
$4,373
$4,696
$4,894
$5,106
$5,326
$5,553
$5,783
$5,882
$5,943
$6,351
Maximum 
Voucher 
Amount
State Budget 
Fiscal 
Impact
$0 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$19,392,588 
$24,239,400 
$25,965,550 
$29,169,741 
$33,822,088 
$38,582,847 
$45,404,252 
$216,576,467 State Total
Estimated Difference 
Between State 
Formula Spending and 
Instructional Spending
Maximum 
Voucher 
Amount
Local Share 
of Voucher 
Funding
Number of 
Vouchers
337
504
591
718
786
1,320
1,606
1,501
5,740
7,596
9,104
10,391
11,209
12,778
14,427
15,887
Resulting 
Local Savings
Local Voucher 
Funding 
Amount
Local Public 
School 
District 
Fiscal 
Impact
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
50%
50%
45%
45%
45%
45%
45%
$2,446
$2,643
$2,745
$2,985
$3,209
$3,667
$4,373
$4,696
$4,894
$5,106
$5,326
$5,553
$5,783
$5,882
$5,943
$6,351
$300 
$300 
$300 
$300 
$300 
$300 
$300 
$300 
$300 
$300 
$300 
$300 
$300 
$300 
$300 
$300 
1990-91
1991-92
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
Local Total
Combined Total
$101,100 
$151,200 
$177,300 
$215,400 
$235,800 
$396,000 
$481,800 
$450,300 
$1,722,000 
($17,113,788)
($21,508,200)
($22,848,250)
($25,807,041)
($29,988,688)
($34,254,747)
($40,638,152)
($188,227,967)
$28,348,500
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$19,392,588
$24,243,952
$25,965,550
$29,169,741
$33,822,088
$38,582,847
$45,404,252
$101,100 
$151,200 
$177,300 
$215,400 
$235,800 
$396,000 
$481,800 
$450,300 
$1,722,000 
$2,278,800 
$2,731,200 
$3,117,300 
$3,362,700 
$3,833,400 
$4,328,100 
$4,766,100 

THE TOTAL NATIONAL FISCAL EFFECT 
OF SCHOOL CHOICE SINCE 1990
Of the twelve school choice programs for 
which data are available, all twelve are 
at least fi scally neutral when the impact 
on state budgets and local public school 
districts is combined. Most produce sub-
stantial fi scal savings – only the two cen-
tury-old town tuitioning programs are fi s-
cally neutral for both the state and local 
districts. Utah’s Carson Smith program is 
neutral for the state, and the impact on 
local districts cannot be calculated due to 
missing public school data. Each of the 
other nine school choice programs has 
generated savings of at least $1 million.
All nine voucher programs analyzed are 
at least fi scally neutral for state budgets. 
Five produce fi scal savings for state bud-
gets, while four are neutral. For the lo-
cal public school districts affected, two 
of the voucher programs (the town tu-
itioning programs) are fi scally neutral, 
four produce fi scal savings, two cannot 
be analyzed due to missing public school 
data, and one (the Milwaukee voucher 
program) produces fi scal costs. The Mil-
waukee program has an unusual funding 
system, opposed even by the local school 
choice movement, that requires the local 
district to pay 45 percent of the cost of the 
vouchers. The district has chosen to meet 
this requirement by raising local taxes so 
that existing public school revenues are 
not affected, but the local fi scal impact is 
still negative.
All three of the tax-credit scholarship 
programs analyzed produce fi scal costs 
for state budgets, but they also produce 
larger savings for local public school dis-
tricts. Pennsylvania’s program produces 
radically larger costs for the state and 
benefi ts for local districts because of the 
state’s unusual funding system; Pennsyl-
vania statewide school spending is not 
directly tied to enrollment levels, as in 
other states. If Pennsylvania were to fund 
education based on enrollment levels, 
both the costs to the state and the sav-
ings for local districts would be reduced 
considerably.
Overall, these twelve school choice pro-
grams have saved a total of nearly half 
a billion dollars. Because voucher and 
scholarship amounts are typically well 
below state formula funding per student 
in the public school system, state budgets 
have saved a total of $22 million. In addi-
tion, the migration of students from pub-
lic schools to private schools has allowed 
districts to reduce their instructional 
spending levels, spreading their local 
and federal revenue over fewer students. 
School choice allows students to attend 
the schools of their choice at a lower cost 
than they would incur in the public school 
system, contrary to the dire fi scal specu-
lations of its critics.
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School Choice Has Saved $444 Million Since 1990
 Total Fiscal 
Impact
$0 
$0 
$28,348,500 
$61,243,589 
$18,268,725 
$138,692,843 
$2,969,528 
$143,606,414 
$41,938,798 
$7,767,214 
$1,012,970 
$0 
New
New
New
New
New
New
New
$443,848,581 
 Public School Districts
Fiscal Impact
$0 
$0 
($188,227,967)*
$61,160,333 
$47,213,269 
$138,692,843 
$1,099,648 
$304,772,414 
$53,593,957 
$3,247,894 
N/At
N/At
New
New
New
New
New
New
New
$421,552,391 
State Budget 
Fiscal Impact
$0 
$0 
$216,576,467 
$83,255 
($28,944,544)
$0 
$1,869,880 
($161,166,000)**
($11,655,159)
$4,519,320 
$1,012,970 
$0 
New
New
New
New
New
New
New
$22,296,189
Data Available 
Through
2004-05
2004-05
2005-06
2004-05
2005-06
2005-06
2005-06
2006-07
2005-06
2005-06
2006-07
N/A
New
New
New
New
New
New
New
Program Began
1869
1873
1990-91
1996-97
1998-99
1999-2000
1999-2000
2000-01
2002-03
2004-05
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2006-07
2006-07
2006-07
2006-07
2006-07
2007-08
Table 17
Vermont
Town Tuitioning
Maine
Town Tuitioning
Wisconsin 
Milwaukee Vouchers
Ohio 
Cleveland Vouchers
Arizona 
Individual Tax-Credit Scholarships
Florida 
McKay Vouchers
Florida
A+ Vouchers
Pennsylvania 
Corporate Tax-Credit Scholarships
Florida 
Corporate Tax-Credit Scholarships
Washington, D.C. 
D.C. Vouchers
Ohio 
Autism Vouchers
Utah 
Carson Smith Vouchers
Arizona
Disabled Student Vouchers
Arizona 
Foster Child Vouchers
Arizona 
Corporate Tax-Credit Scholarships
Iowa 
Individual Tax-Credit Scholarships
Ohio
EdChoice Vouchers
 
Rhode Island 
Corporate Tax-Credit Scholarships
Utah
Parent Choice Vouchers
Total
* Milwaukee’s voucher program only creates costs for the local public school district due to an unusual funding system that requires the district to bear part 
of the cost of funding the vouchers. Without this unusual system, the program would have been revenue neutral for the state and would have saved the local 
school district $28 million. The local school choice movement in Milwaukee supports changing the funding system to reduce the local fi scal burden.
** Pennsylvania’s program only creates such high costs for the state due to an unusual state funding system in which statewide school spending is not directly 
tied to enrollment levels.  If Pennsylvania’s public school funding varied with enrollment, state costs would be radically reduced, and the savings to local 
public school districts would be reduced by an equal amount.
t Public school spending data are unavailable.

1   See Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, University of Chicago Press, 1962, p.89.
2  For a detailed account of this experience see Daniel McGroarty, Break These Chains: The Battle for School Choice, Prima Publishing, 1996.
3  Not all states fund public education through the use of a foundation formula. In these cases, it is much more diffi cult to determine how total state rev-
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that average daily membership by a set amount for these categories.
5  The process is actually much more complex than this simple description implies. Many variables such as student characteristic weights, a teacher ex-
perience index, and average daily bus route miles are factored into the formula as well. The amount considered here is the portion of state funding that is 
based on enrollment and that changes when enrollment changes. 
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Education’s National Center for Education Statistics. Unfortunately, the survey stopped collecting data on tuition levels after 1999-2000. We assume that 
the average tuition would have increased by 5 percent per year since then.
8  As the 2005-06 data are not yet available, we assume that the state formula spending per student remained constant from 2004-05. However, it is more 
likely that this number increased, making this a conservative estimate. State formula spending cannot be imputed from previous years’ data, as is the 
case with instructional expenditures, because it is much more subject to political changes and other unpredictable factors.
9  As the 2005-06 data are not yet available, we assume that the state formula spending per student remained constant from 2004-05. However, it is more 
likely that this number increased, making this a conservative estimate. State formula spending cannot be imputed from previous years’ data, as is the 
case with instructional expenditures, because it is much more subject to political changes and other unpredictable factors.
10  The FEFP was enacted by the Florida legislature in 1973 in order to provide equalization of revenue while recognizing varying local property tax bases, 
varying educational program cost and varying costs of living. See Florida Department of Education, 2002-03 Funding for Florida School Districts: Statisti-
cal Report, EIAS Series 2003-06, September 2002.
11  For the 2006-07 school year the BSA is $3,961.81. This is the per-student amount that the state estimates is required to cover the basic operational ex-
penses of an average student in Grades 4-8 (students in other grades are weighted more heavily and so receive more funds).
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